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Decades of theory and experimental evi-
dence underscore the critical importance
of inhibitory functions to flexible, context-
appropriate and goal-directed action
(Diamond et al., 1963; Logan and Cowan,
1984; Aron et al., 2004; Friedman and
Miyake, 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004;
Munakata et al., 2011). Deficits in
inhibitory control and response inhibi-
tion have been implicated in substance use
disorders, attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder, and impulse control disorders
(Jentsch and Taylor, 1999; Nigg, 2001; Li
and Sinha, 2008; Groman et al., 2009),
and may also play a role in depression
and anxiety (Disner et al., 2011; Jovanovic
and Norrholm, 2011). But despite excit-
ing progress in this area of cognitive and
clinical neuroscience, some fundamental
questions remain unsolved, and may be
hindering the translational efforts aiming
at improving the treatment and prevention
of disorders characterized by impairment
or dysregulation of inhibitory functions.
The purpose of this Opinion is to
highlight some alternative ideas and
approaches in neuroscience research on
response inhibition and inhibitory con-
trol that have emerged in the literature,
in order to stimulate debate and suggest
hypotheses for future research. In particu-
lar, building on recent neuroscience-based
accounts of response inhibition (e.g.,
Mostofsky and Simmonds, 2008; van
Gaal et al., 2008; Munakata et al., 2011), I
argue against the long-standing and per-
vasive view that there is a fundamental
distinction between inhibitory processes
on the one hand and response selection
and execution processes on the other
hand. Although intuitive, this view does
not appear to be supported by evidence.
Instead, until there is evidence to the con-
trary, I propose a more parsimonious view
of inhibitory control mechanisms in the
brain, such that: (1) response inhibition
can be either a control process (to override
a prepotent response tendency) or it can
itself be a prepotent response tendency
(to be overridden); (2) response inhi-
bition processes and response selection
and execution processes are fundamen-
tally the same; and (3) we learn to inhibit
a response in fundamentally the same
way that we learn to select and execute a
response.
PROPOSITION 1: RESPONSE
INHIBITION CAN BE EITHER A
CONTROL PROCESS (TO OVERRIDE A
PREPOTENT RESPONSE TENDENCY)
OR A PREPOTENT RESPONSE
TENDENCY (TO BE OVERRIDDEN)
A long-standing assumption has been
that response inhibition processes, and
inhibitory control more generally, are
fundamentally different from response
selection and execution processes. This
assumption in part derives from the
centuries-old and highly influential tradi-
tion of dichotomizing between the top-
down, voluntary and deliberate control
processes, and the bottom-up, stimulus-
driven and automatic response tenden-
cies that often need to be overridden. In
fact, a typical experimental paradigm used
to examine inhibitory control (such as
Go/NoGo and Stop-Signal tasks) requires
a deliberate, effortful inhibition of a
prepotent, automatic response, creating
the illusion that inhibitory control is
always deliberate and effortful whereas the
response to be inhibited is always prepo-
tent and automatic. But one can think of
conditions and situations in which this
relationship is reversed, e.g., a patient
with social anxiety may have to intention-
ally and effortfully overcome his or her
prepotent tendency to refrain from pub-
lic speaking, and many of us would face a
similar challenge if asked to get up on the
stage and sing.
Therefore, I argue that response inhi-
bition is not a control process by default;
instead, it may function as either a control
process (to override a prepotent response
tendency) or as a prepotent response ten-
dency itself (to be overridden), depend-
ing on the situational demands and/or
the relative strengths of the two compet-
ing goal representations. I expand on the
idea of inhibitory goal representation in
Proposition 2, and I discuss the notion of
automatic inhibition in Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 2: THE BRAIN
PROCESSES MEDIATING RESPONSE
INHIBITION ARE FUNDAMENTALLY
THE SAME AS THE BRAIN PROCESSES
MEDIATING RESPONSE SELECTION
AND EXECUTION
Evidence from human functional MRI
(fMRI) studies using Go/NoGo, Stop-
Signal, and similar tasks suggests that
inhibition of a motor response engages
the same network (or networks) of brain
regions that are engaged during selection
and execution of this motor response. In
particular, response inhibition processes
engage a distributed network of both cor-
tical and subcortical regions, including the
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; or inferior
frontal cortex, IFC), insula, anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC), pre-supplementary
motor cortex (pre-SMA), dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC), parietal regions,
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and basal ganglia [e.g., (Rubia et al., 2001;
Garavan et al., 2002; Aron and Poldrack,
2006); for meta-analyses, see (Wager et al.,
2005; Simmonds et al., 2008; Swick et al.,
2011; Criaud and Boulinguez, 2013; Hart
et al., 2013)]. For instance, there is a
compelling neuroimaging and lesion evi-
dence of the critical role of the IFG in
inhibitory control (Konishi et al., 1999;
Aron et al., 2003; Rubia et al., 2003). Yet,
as demonstrated by a recent fMRI study in
over 1800 subjects (Whelan et al., 2012),
a frontal network centered on the IFG is
engaged both during successful inhibition
trials and during failed inhibition trials
(i.e., when subjects erroneously executed
the response). Similarly compelling is the
neuroimaging evidence for the importance
of the pre-SMA in inhibitory control [e.g.,
(Rubia et al., 2001; Mostofsky et al., 2003;
Garavan et al., 2006), for meta-analyses,
see (Simmonds et al., 2008; Swick et al.,
2011; Criaud and Boulinguez, 2013)]. But
as reviewed by Mostofsky and Simmonds
(2008), the pre-SMA also plays a crit-
ical role in both response preparation
and response selection. In fact, evidence
from electrophysiological recordings in
non-human primates suggests that some
pre-SMA neurons participate both in the
suppression of the incorrect response and
in the facilitation of the correct response
in a saccade Go/NoGo task (Isoda and
Hikosaka, 2007), suggesting that response
inhibition processes overlap with response
selection processes not only at the level
of large-scale brain networks involved, but
also at the level of individual neurons.
Similarly, at the level of synaptic trans-
mission, response inhibition processes
may not be fundamentally different
from response selection and execu-
tion processes. It is sometimes assumed
that response inhibition must rely on
inhibitory synaptic transmission to a
larger degree than response selection and
execution processes. But why should it be
the case? Inhibitory synaptic transmission
involving the neurotransmitter gamma-
aminobutyric acid (GABA) is known
to be as important as excitatory gluta-
matergic transmission both at cortical and
subcortical levels (Kandel et al., 2000).
Fast inhibitory synaptic transmission is
mediated primarily by ionotropic GABAA
receptors, which hyperpolarize the cell
and thus raise the threshold for firing an
action potential when activated. When
GABAA receptors are localized to postsy-
naptic glutamatergic neurons, they serve
to inhibit the activity of these neurons.
But GABAA receptors can also be local-
ized to postsynaptic GABAergic neurons,
in which case they may serve to disin-
hibit (rather than inhibit) the activity of
downstream glutamatergic neurons, lead-
ing to activation rather than inhibition at
the local-circuit or larger-network level.
Conversely, activation of glutamatergic
neurons may be required to activate a
group of GABAergic neurons and trig-
ger inhibition. Thus, successful response
inhibition likely relies on reciprocal inter-
actions between inhibitory GABAergic
neurons and excitatory glutamatergic neu-
rons, rather than on inhibitory GABAergic
transmission alone.
PROPOSITION 3: WE LEARN TO
INHIBIT A RESPONSE IN
FUNDAMENTALLY THE SAME WAY
THANWE LEARN TO SELECT AND
EXECUTE A RESPONSE
We have a working model of how the
brain learns to select and execute a spe-
cific response: such learning is thought
to involve the formation of a distributed
neural goal or task representation in the
prefrontal cortex (Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Sakai, 2008), by which a specific pattern of
sensory input becomes progressively asso-
ciated with a specific pattern of motor
output via long-term potentiation (LTP)
and associated synaptic-plasticity pro-
cesses at glutamatergic synapses (Kandel
et al., 2000). In comparison, the processes
underlying inhibitory goal representations
and inhibitory learning remain less well-
understood—including synaptic plasticity
at inhibitory synapses (for a recent review,
see Castillo et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, if response inhibition
processes are fundamentally the same as
response selection and execution pro-
cesses, then it follows that the neu-
ral representation of inhibitory goals (or
Stop goals) should not fundamentally dif-
fer from the neural representations of
response selection and execution goals (or
Go goals), and the underlying learning
processes should also be fundamentally the
same. In the influential horse-race mod-
els (Logan and Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen
and Logan, 2009b), response inhibition in
a Stop-Signal task is conceptualized as a
race between a Go process triggered by a
Go stimulus (i.e., a Go goal) and a Stop
process triggered by a Stop stimulus (i.e.,
a Stop goal). In this model, the compet-
ing Go and Stop goals are regarded as
equivalent, and it is the relative timing
of the Go and Stop processes that deter-
mines whether the response is success-
fully inhibited or not. In fact, Munakata
and colleagues (2011) have argued that
at least some inhibitory control pro-
cesses can be understood in terms of
such competition between goal repre-
sentations in the prefrontal cortex, and
it is the relative strength of these goal
representations that determines whether
a behavioral response is executed or
inhibited by that individual in a given
situation.
Furthermore, although counterin-
tuitive, growing evidence suggests that
response inhibition processes may be
stimulus-driven to the same extent that
response selection and execution processes
are stimulus-driven. In fact, one and the
same stimulus can activate both a goal
representation to carry out a behavior and
a goal representation to inhibit this behav-
ior. For instance, food-related cues may
activate both a goal to consume the food
and a competing goal to stay on a diet
(Fishbach et al., 2003; Hare et al., 2009;
Kroese et al., 2011); smoking-related cues
and smoking-cessation messages may acti-
vate both a goal to smoke a cigarette and
a competing goal to abstain from smok-
ing (Brody et al., 2007; Jasinska et al.,
2012); and signals of threat may activate
both aggressive and fear-related behav-
iors (Beaver et al., 2008; Passamonti et al.,
2008).
Finally, following the same logic,
there is no reason why response inhibi-
tion should not become automatic—and
inhibitory control habitual—with appro-
priate and sufficient practice. Specifically,
if response inhibition can be triggered
by a Stop stimulus in the same fashion
that response selection and execution
is triggered by a Go stimulus, then a
consistent mapping between a specific
Stop stimulus and the inhibition of a
specific response should result in practice-
related improvements and eventually
automaticity (Verbruggen and Logan,
2009a; Lenartowicz et al., 2011), even if
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Stop stimuli are not consciously perceived
[(van Gaal et al., 2008, 2009, 2010); see
also (Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2003)].
Indeed, such practice-related improve-
ments have been demonstrated in the
Go/NoGo task, which relied on consistent
stimulus-inhibition associations, but not
in the Stop-Signal task, in which no such
associations were learned [(Verbruggen
and Logan, 2008); see also, (Verbruggen
and Logan, 2009b)]. Converging evi-
dence of such learned stimulus-inhibition
association—or automatic inhibition—
following training in a Go/NoGo task
was also demonstrated by reduced corti-
cospinal excitability on Go trials preceded
by NoGo trials, relative to Go trials pre-
ceded by Go trials (Chiu et al., 2012).
Interestingly, despite a lack of such consis-
tent stimulus-inhibition mapping, direct
activation of the right IFG with transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS)
improved response inhibition in the Stop-
Signal task relative to sham condition
(Jacobson et al., 2011). These findings
support the view that inhibitory con-
trol can become habitual. However, if
response inhibition and response exe-
cution are learned in the same manner,
it follows that learning of stimulus-
inhibition associations should follow
the same principles of initial specificity
and subsequent generalization. These
principles may determine the extent of
generalization—or conversely, the limits of
transfer—in training-based interventions
for inhibitory control deficits.
CONCLUSIONS
In this Opinion article, drawing on recent
neuroscience-based accounts of inhibitory
control mechanisms in the human brain
(e.g., Mostofsky and Simmonds, 2008; van
Gaal et al., 2008; Munakata et al., 2011), I
argued that: (1) response inhibition can be
either a control process (to override a pre-
potent response tendency) or it can itself
be a prepotent response tendency (to be
overridden); (2) response inhibition pro-
cesses and response selection and execu-
tion processes are fundamentally the same;
and (3) we learn to inhibit a response
in fundamentally the same way that we
learn to select and execute a response.
These propositions have implications for
both basic and translational neuroscience
research on inhibitory control, and the
goal is to stimulate debate and inspire
novel hypotheses for future research, ulti-
mately aimed at treatment and prevention
of inhibitory control deficits.
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